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Abstract
Although recent studies have shown that electricity systems with shares of wind and solar above 80% can be affordable, economists
have raised concerns about market integration. Correlated generation from variable renewable sources depresses market prices,
which can cause wind and solar to cannibalize their own revenues and prevent them from covering their costs from the market. This
cannibalization appears to set limits on the integration of wind and solar, and thus contradict studies that show that high shares are
cost effective. Here we show from theory and with numerical examples how policies interact with prices, revenue and costs for
renewable electricity systems. The decline in average revenue seen in some recent literature is due to an implicit policy assumption
that technologies are forced into the system, whether it be with subsidies or quotas. If instead the driving policy is a carbon dioxide
cap or tax, wind and solar shares can rise without cannibalising their own market revenue, even at penetrations of wind and solar
above 80%. Policy is thus the primary factor driving lower market values; the variability of wind and solar is only a secondary
factor that accelerates the decline if they are subsidised. The strong dependence of market value on the policy regime means that
market value needs to be used with caution as a measure of market integration.
Keywords: market value of variable renewables, renewable energy policy, CO2 tax, feed-in-tariff, merit order effect, large-scale
integration of renewable power generation
1. Highlights
• Decreasing market value (MV) with wind and solar share
is a result of policy choices
• In long-term equilibria, wind and solar subsidies reduce
MV, but CO2 prices do not
• Models with rising CO2 prices see rising wind and solar
(VRE) with no reduction in MV
• Falling MV in models with VRE subsidy do not necessar-
ily indicate integration problems
• These results are confirmed using economic theory and in
a power system model
2. Introduction
Rising shares of wind and solar in electricity markets around
the world have led to concerns about their market integration
at high penetrations. Several studies have found empirical ev-
idence that electricity prices have decreased in markets with a
high share of variable renewable energy (VRE) [1–8]. The rea-
son behind the lower prices is that the additional wind- and solar
capacity bid into the market with their marginal costs, which are
∗Corresponding author
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close to zero. This pushes out some of the more expensive gen-
erators, and, since the price is usually set by the marginal cost
of the last generator needed to satisfy demand, the prices are
depressed during times of wind/solar generation. Lower prices
lead to lower revenues for all generators (the ‘merit order ef-
fect’ [2]), but especially so for wind- and solar generators, since
their generation depresses prices exactly when they are gener-
ating most, an effect known as ‘cannibalization’ [7, 8]. Both the
generally lower prices and the cannibalization effect have been
perceived as problematic, because they lead to lower revenues
and would lead to less incentive to invest in new capacity in a
free market [3, 9].
These empirical observations [1–8] were made in electricity
systems where the existing conventional power generation fleet
remained largely unchanged (i.e. it is a short-term effect). The
decline in revenue for wind and solar with their penetration has
also been demonstrated in computer models of the power mar-
ket where investments in all generator capacity are optimised
[10–13] (i.e. in a long-term equilibrium). The size of the effect
was estimated to be a decrease in revenues by half at penetra-
tion levels of 15% (solar) and 30% (wind) [12]. The hypothesis
put forward in these papers is that it is the variability of wind
and solar that causes the decline [10, 12–14].
The idea that variability sets a ceiling for the cost-effective
penetration level of VRE electricity has been influential.
Blasquez [15] claims that “The Paradox holds as long as mar-
ket clear prices with short term marginal costs, and renewable
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technology’s marginal cost is close to zero and not dispatch-
able”, i.e. that energy-only markets with variable renewables
inherently entail decreasing market value with penetration lev-
els. Some have even suggested that the capacity factor (typi-
cally 10-25% for solar and 20-40% for onshore wind) should
be considered as a limit on penetration [16].
In apparent contradiction to the above-mentioned market in-
tegration studies, the last few years have also seen an increas-
ing number of cost-minimizing energy system studies with
high shares (>80%) of variable renewables [17–26]. The sys-
tem solutions of these studies correspond to long-term equilib-
ria where all generators, including VRE technologies, exactly
cover their costs with their market revenue (the ‘zero-profit
rule’ [27]). This seems to contradict market value studies that
claim that wind and solar revenue will be pushed below the
cost-recovery level at high penetrations.
Here we resolve this contradiction by showing in economic
theory, mathematics and in model simulations how cost, rev-
enue and policy interact. We show that market value studies
find declining market value by construction because of the VRE
support policies they choose to implement (be it quotas, feed-
in tariffs, feed-in premiums or capacity incentives). If instead
carbon dioxide (CO2) taxes are used as the primary policy in-
strument to raise wind and solar share, then VRE revenue will
always be sufficient to cover generation costs. While many mar-
ket studies have considered the impact of CO2 taxes [12, 13],
CO2 taxes have only ever been a subordinate policy to the main
policy of VRE support. The resolution of the paradox requires
replacing VRE support with CO2 reduction incentives.
In this paper we focus on long-term effects in power market
models where the entire fleet investment can be optimized. First
we consider the economic theory (Section 3), show it in a the-
oretical optimization model (Section 4) and then demonstrate
the effects in a reimplementation of the energy system model
EMMA used in [12] in the PyPSA modelling framework [28]
(Section 6).
3. Economic theory
3.1. Zero-profit rule, market value and LCOE without policy
measures
In a long-term equilibrium, where generator capacity is opti-
mised along with power system operation under idealised con-
ditions of perfect market competition without any further con-
straints, producers make zero profit in the long-term equilib-
rium [27]. If any producer makes a net profit, new produc-
ers will enter the market and competition will drive profits to
zero; similarly if producers make a net loss, some will exit the
market until losses are eliminated. For electricity markets, this
zero-profit condition means in a long-term equilibrium that the
average revenue that generators receive from the market exactly
cover their costs.
The zero-profit condition can be restated per unit of gener-
ated energy in terms of the market value MVs and levelized
cost of electricity LCOEs of each generator s:
MVs = LCOEs (1)
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Figure 1: The effect of VRE and CO2 policies on energy-only electricity mar-
kets in the short- and long-term, for a system where zero-CO2-emission gen-
erators also have zero marginal costs (like wind and solar). a) The short-term
effect of a VRE policy introduces more VRE capacity, and thus increases the
part of the supply curve that is zero. The non-VRE supply curve is unchanged.
b) The long-term effect is that some non-VRE generators are pushed out of the
market, and thus the non-VRE supply curve becomes steeper. c) The short-
term effect of a CO2 policy is to make the non-VRE supply curve steeper. d)
In the long-term, the rising prices due to the increase of bid prices makes room
for investment in VRE. The dotted lines indicate the market clearing price be-
fore policy (black) and after policy (red). The arrows indicate the direction of
change of the supply curve (dashed) and market price (dotted).
The market value is defined as the revenue averaged over each
unit of energy sold. The LCOE is defined as the sum of all
investment, fuel, operational and maintenance costs averaged
over each unit of generated energy. The equality (1) is proved
for a general long-term equilibrium power model in the Section
4.1.
Different generators have different market values because
they occupy different niches in the optimal system, depending
on their characteristics such as cost and availability.
3.2. VRE policies
Additional policy measures alter the zero-profit condition de-
scribed above.
Under ‘VRE policy’ we group all policies that encourage
wind and solar investment beyond the pure cost-optimum, ei-
ther by mandating a certain share of VRE, or by creating a
revenue stream independent of the electricity market. Exam-
ples of such policies include Renewable Energy Portfolio Stan-
dards (RPS) in various US states and Feed-in Tariffs (FiT) in
Germany, which gives a renumeration for every unit of energy
generated from wind and solar.
The fact that an additional subsidy is required to achieve a
higher share implies that the generator no longer makes suf-
ficient revenue from the market to cover its costs. The sub-
sidy required to cover costs can be translated into an equivalent
Feed-in Premium (FiP) µs > 0 paid per unit of generated en-
ergy, thus modifying the zero-profit condition at equilibrium to
MVs = LCOEs − µs (2)
The FiP tops up the average revenue received by the generator
from the market to the LCOE so that the generator covers its
costs.
2
This relation holds regardless of the policy. If VRE gener-
ation is forced to cover a fixed share of demand, we show in
Section 4.3 that µs is the shadow price of the corresponding
constraint. If the share of VRE generation available before cur-
tailment is fixed instead of the actual generation [12, 29], µs
is proportional to the shadow price of the constraint (see Ap-
pendix B.1). If generators do not participate in the market at
all, but are paid a Feed-in Tariff (FiT) to cover their costs at the
same level as the LCOE, then µs is the difference between the
average market value and the tariff.
The equivalent FiP, µs, rises with the deviation from the pure
cost-optimum without the VRE policy, thus suppressing the
market value. The decline in market value is an indirect ef-
fect of the decline of market prices during the hours of VRE
production. The mechanism for the effect of VRE policies is
schematically depicted in Figure 1 for the short-term (Figure
1a) and long-term (Figure 1b). That market revenue sinks with
a rising forced penetration is the essential result observed in the
literature on the market value of renewables [10, 12, 13].
This does not contradict the zero-profit condition, since it
only applies to an undistorted equilibrium. We have departed
from the equilibrium solution by forcing a share of a technol-
ogy. The other technologies are still freely optimized, and are
thus still subject to the zero-profit rule, although their share of
total generation will be lower.
3.3. CO2 policies
CO2 policies include direct CO2 taxes and CO2 caps with
traded certificates. They indirectly support wind, solar and
other low-emission technologies by penalising high-emission
generators.
Under CO2 policies, the zero-profit rule still holds, but the
relationship between revenue and costs now include the equiv-
alent CO2 tax µCO2 (in euro per tonne of CO2, ACtCO
−1
2 ) and the
technology-specific emission factor es (in tCO2MWh−1)
MVs = LCOEs + esµCO2 (3)
This relation is proven in Section 4.4.
For technologies like wind and solar with no emissions, we
have exact cost recovery MVs = LCOEs. CO2-emitting gener-
ators have to cover both generation costs and the CO2 tax with
their market revenue at equilibrium, and are thus pressured out
of the market to the benefit of low-CO2 generation.
CO2 policies raise the market values of CO2-emitting gener-
ation by raising prices at hours when they are setting the price,
see Figure 1 for the short-term (Figure 1c) and long-term effect
(Figure 1d).
3.4. Comparison of VRE- and CO2 policies
The effects of the two types of policy are strikingly different.
VRE policies depress market prices when renewable generators
are running and offer them compensation outside of the market,
whereas CO2 policies raise market prices when fossil-fueled
generators are running, thus encouraging low-emission gener-
ators into the market. For renewable generators, VRE policies
increase their share but reduce their average market revenue,
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Figure 2: Comparison of dispatch, market price and average solar revenue for
simple long-term equilibrium models with only four technologies (lignite, coal,
gas and solar) and (a) no policy, (b) VRE policy and (c) CO2 policy. The VRE
and CO2 policies are tuned to given the same penetration of solar.
whereas CO2 policies increase their share while leaving their
zero-profit condition intact. For fossil-fueled generators, VRE
policies reduce their share of the market but do not affect the
zero-profit condition, while CO2 policies increase the overall
costs they need to cover from the market, thus also reducing
their share.
Figure 2 provides an illustration of how the two policies im-
pact dispatch, price and momentary revenue in a simple case
with solar and three fossil technologies (lignite, hard coal and
gas). The VRE policy lowers prices both by the merit order
effect when solar is feeding in and by turning prices negative
when solar is price-setting (see the next section for a discus-
sion of this mechanism). Under the CO2 policy, prices go to
zero when solar is price-setting, but this is more than compen-
sated by the rise in prices when the fossil-fuelled generators are
price-setting. With no policy, there is sufficient revenue for so-
lar to cover its costs. For the CO2 policy this is also the case,
since the area under the revenue curve is the same, but the hours
when solar earns change: it earns less at midday, but more on
the flanks of its generation profile. For the VRE policy, prices
and revenue are lower at all times when it generates, so solar
cannot cover its costs from the market.
Additional flexibility options such as transmission, demand
response and storage alter the background system by allowing
price arbitrage to smooth the variability of renewable genera-
tors [12, 30, 31]. By providing more demand in hours with
low prices, flexibility helps to raise prices when renewables are
abundant [32]. More flexibility means that lower subsidies are
required for VRE policies to reach a given penetration level,
while for CO2 policies a lower CO2 price is required for a given
abatement level when flexibility is available.
3
4. Mathematical theory
In this section we use a long-term optimisation model to
show how prices and market values relate to costs and policy
measures, and in particular under what circumstances the ‘zero
profit’ rule holds. Proofs are provided for the equations stated
in the previous section. The optimization problem setup and use
of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions follows the textbook
by Biggar and Hesamzadeh [33].
4.1. Long-term equilibrium without policy measures
We maximize yearly social welfare for a single node with
linear supply cost functions in a long-term equilibrium:
max
da,t ,gs,t ,Gs
∑
a,t
Ua,t(da,t) −
∑
s
csGs −
∑
s,t
osgs,t
 (4)
subject to ∑
a
da,t −
∑
s
gs,t = 0 ⊥ λt ∀t (5)
−gs,t ≤ 0 ⊥ µ
¯ s,t
∀s, t (6)
gs,t − g¯s,tGs ≤ 0 ⊥ µ¯s,t ∀s, t (7)
Here t labels time periods representing a year of load and
weather conditions, a labels consumers, s labels generators, da,t
is the demand, gs,t is the generator dispatch, Gs is the genera-
tor capacity and g¯s,t ∈ [0, 1] is the availability/capacity factor
(which varies with time for variable renewable generators like
wind and solar). λt is the marginal price of electricity, while µ¯s,t
and µ
¯ s,t
represent shadow prices of the generator constraints. cs
represent fixed annual costs, while os represent variable costs.
Ua,t(da,t) is the differentiable consumer utility function.
Conventions are chosen such that λt is positive if the price-
setting generator has positive marginal costs, and such that all
shadow prices µ are positive or zero. The definition of the La-
grangian L and KKT conditions are provided in Appendix A.
From KKT stationarity we have for the variables representing
the generator dispatch gs,t and capacity Gs:
∂L
∂gs,t
= 0⇒ −os + λt + µ
¯ s,t
− µ¯s,t = 0 (8)
∂L
∂Gs
= 0⇒ −cs +
∑
t
g¯s,tµ¯s,t = 0 (9)
while from KKT complementary slackness we get for the in-
equality constraints:
µ
¯ s,t
gs,t = 0 (10)
µ¯s,t(g¯s,tGs − gs,t) = 0 (11)
We will now show that each generator s exactly makes back
their costs csGs +
∑
t osgs,t from their market revenue
∑
t λtgs,t,
i.e. the ‘zero-profit condition’.
csGs +
∑
t
osgs,t =
∑
t
g¯s,tµ¯s,t
Gs + ∑
t
(
λt + µ
¯ s,t
− µ¯s,t
)
gs,t
=
∑
t
[
λtgs,t + µ¯s,t(g¯s,tGs − gs,t) + µ
¯ s,t
gs,t
]
=
∑
t
λtgs,t (12)
The first step substitutes the equations from KKT stationarity;
in the second step terms are reorganised; in the final step the
equations from KKT complementary slackness are applied.
We can use this, along with primal feasibility for the demand
balancing constraint (5), to show that the total generator costs
are equal to the total payments by consumers:
∑
s
csGs + ∑
t
osgs,t
 = ∑
s,t
λtgs,t =
∑
a,t
λtda,t (13)
For a situation with inelastic demand where we can reduce
the overall problem to generator cost minimisation, this is the
statement of strong duality between the objectives of the primal
and dual problems. Note, however, that equation (12) also holds
at the level of individual generators.
4.2. LCOE, MV and RMV without policy measures
When both sides of (12) are divided by the generator’s total
dispatch we recover on the left the definition of the levelized
cost of energy (LCOE) of the generator:
LCOEs ≡ csGs +
∑
t osgs,t∑
t gs,t
(14)
and on the right the definition of the market value (MV) of
the generator, sometimes called the absolute market value [12],
which gives us the average revenue when the generator is pro-
ducing:
MVs ≡
∑
t gs,tλt∑
t gs,t
(15)
The equality (12) then gives us:
LCOEs = MVs ∀s (16)
This is a restatement of the zero-profit rule on an averaged per-
MWh basis.
The relative market value (RMV), also called the value factor
in [12], is the ratio of the market value to the load-weighted
average market price:
RMVs ≡ MVs
(∑
a,t da,tλt∑
t da,t
)−1
=
(∑
t gs,tλt
) (∑
a,t da,t
)
(∑
t gs,t
) (∑
a,t da,tλt
) (17)
Using the zero-profit rule (12) and the energy balance con-
straint (5) we can rewrite the RMV:
RMVs =
(
csGs +
∑
t osgs,t∑
r crGr +
∑
r,t orgr,t
) ( ∑
t gs,t∑
a,t da,t
)−1
(18)
4
From this it can be seen that in the absence of other constraints,
the RMV is the ratio of a technology’s share of total costs (first
fraction) to its share of demand (second fraction). If a particular
technology has a similar share of both energy provision and
costs, then it will have a RMV close to unity.
4.3. Long-term equilibrium with VRE policy
If a subset of generators S is singled out and forced to meet
a fixed proportion of the demand, this is represented with the
constraint ∑
s∈S ,t
gs,t ≥ Γ ⊥ µΓ (19)
For example, for a particular penetration of wind, S would rep-
resent all wind generators and Γ would be a fixed fraction of the
annual demand.
For generators included in the constraint, s ∈ S , the station-
arity equation (8) for gs,t from the previous section is altered
to
∂L
∂gs,t
= 0⇒ −os + λt + µ
¯ r,t
− µ¯r,t + µΓ = 0 (20)
so that now for the generators in S
csGs +
∑
t
osgs,t =
∑
t
gs,t(λt + µΓ) ∀s ∈ S (21)
For generators excluded from the constraint, s < S , the zero-
profit rule remains exactly the same as (12).
If (19) is not binding, then µΓ = 0 and the zero-profit rule
is recovered. In this case the given share is already part of the
unconstrained optimum. However if (19) is binding, then more
generation from S is being forced into the solution than the op-
timum without constraint (19), therefore µΓ > 0 and generators
in S can no longer recover their costs from the market prices λt
alone. µΓ represents the per-MWh subsidy, or Feed-in Premium
(FiP), required beyond the market price for generators in S to
recover their costs.
Dividing by the total generation
∑
t gs,t we find for s ∈ S
LCOEs = MVs + µΓ ∀s ∈ S (22)
For s < S we have the regular no-profit rule
LCOEs = MVs ∀s < S (23)
Expressed another way: forcing in the penetration of a par-
ticular technology above its unconstrained optimal share de-
presses the market prices λt at the times when it is generating.
This accounts for the ‘market value’ effect in long-term equi-
librium models observed in [12].
The solution found here, including the values of all primal
and dual variables, can be reproduced by removing the con-
straint (19) and making the substitution os → os − µΓ for s ∈ S ,
i.e. moving µΓgs,t to the left-hand side of (21) (see proof in
Appendix B.6). The VRE policy thus depresses market prices
by two mechanisms: when VRE are generating, the merit or-
der effect pushes down prices even when VRE generators are
not price-setting; when VRE generators are price-setting, they
can turn the market prices negative if µΓ is larger than their
marginal cost os. Negative bids are rational for generators if
they are guaranteed the subsidy even when prices are negative.
In reality, some markets suspend support for subsidized gener-
ators bidding in the market once market prices turn negative for
a sufficient time (6 hours in the case of Germany [34]), thereby
removing the incentive for them to bid negative prices and thus
mitigating this effect. In this case, examined in Appendix E.2,
VRE policies still depress prices by the merit order effect.
4.4. Long-term equilibrium with CO2 policy
If, rather than picking particular technologies, we replace
constraint (19) with a CO2 cap K, the behaviour is different.
Consider the CO2 constraint:∑
s,t
esgs,t ≤ K ⊥ µCO2 (24)
where es is the emission factor in tonne-CO2 per MWhel for
generator s and K is a cap on yearly emissions in tonne-CO2 per
year. This constraint has the same form as (19), except for the
direction of the inequality sign and the weighting of generation.
The stationarity equation (8) is altered to
∂L
∂gs,t
= 0⇒ −os + λt + µ
¯ s,t
− µ¯s,t − esµCO2 = 0 (25)
and now
csGs +
∑
t
osgs,t =
∑
t
gs,t(λt − esµCO2 ) ∀s (26)
If the constraint (24) is binding, it pushes up market prices be-
yond the cost-recovery point so that charges for CO2 emissions
are also covered from the market.
Dividing by the total generation
∑
t gs,t we find
LCOEs = MVs − esµCO2 ∀s ∈ S (27)
In this case, generators with no direct emissions, es = 0,
continue to satisfy the zero-profit rule. Emitting generators with
es > 0 have to cover the CO2 price with their market revenues,
but still recover their costs once the CO2 levy has been paid.
The same solution can be obtained by replacing the CO2 con-
straint with a direct cost of CO2 and making the substitution
os → os + esµCO2 , i.e. moving the term esµCO2 gs,t to the left-
hand side of (26). Through the higher effective operating costs
for CO2-emitting generators, the CO2 price increases market
prices when these generators are setting the price.
4.5. More complicated setups
Proofs for more complicated setups (fixed shares for avail-
able rather than dispatched energy, limited installation poten-
tials, multi-node networks, storage, non-linear generation costs)
can be found in Appendix B.
5
5. Numerical power system model description
The theoretical insights developed above are demonstrated in
a numerical market model based on EMMA [12] that has been
reimplemented in the open PyPSA framework [28]. The code
for the model is available online under an open licence [35].
The model has five nodes for Germany and four of its neigh-
bours: Poland, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. The
model minimizes long-term generation costs over historical
hourly load and weather for the year 2010, assuming an in-
elastic demand and a high value of lost load (1000 AC/MWh).
The model completely rebuilds the existing system (‘greenfield
investment’) except for pumped hydro storage, for which exist-
ing capacities are taken assuming an energy storage capacity of
eight hours at nominal power.
Generators are aggregated into representative classes for
each technology. The available variable renewable technolo-
gies are wind and solar power, while the dispatchable genera-
tors are coal, lignite, lignite with CCS, nuclear, open cycle gas
turbines (OCGT) and combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT). We
keep most of EMMA’s cost and other technical assumptions,
but update the wind cost from 1300 AC/kWp to 1040 AC/kWp and
the solar cost from 2000 AC/kWp to 510 AC/kWp to reflect fore-
casts for 2030 made by the Danish Energy Agency in 2019 [36]
(these assumptions are conservative given that some studies see
a cost of 460 AC/kWp for utility solar already today [37]; with
our assumptions the LCOE of wind and solar are still above
reverse auction results in Germany in 2019). A table of tech-
nology assumptions can be found in Appendix C. To concen-
trate on the interaction of market policy and market prices, the
wind and solar costs are fixed for the simulations and no learn-
ing effects are applied for high penetrations of wind and solar
that might reduce costs. In addition, we remove the options for
new nuclear and CCS in order to focus on the penetration of
variable renewable energy; further simulations with nuclear are
presented in Appendix E. The removal of the options for new
nuclear and CCS can also be seen as representative of the pol-
icy environment in countries like Germany with regard to these
technologies. Based on the results for total system cost below,
the cost point at which these dispatchable technologies would
compete with wind and solar can be deduced ex post.
Transmission capacities between countries are fixed at the
net transfer capacities (NTC) values from summer 2010. Fol-
lowing [12] a discount rate of 7% is applied. To ensure that
additional constraints do not distort the theoretical picture de-
veloped in the previous section, we do not assume a baseload
premium (whereby nuclear, coal and lignite run even if their
variable cost is higher than the market price) nor do we model
reserve requirements or revenue from reserve markets. To avoid
interference with the CO2 policy we introduce here, we also re-
move the CO2 price of 20 AC/tCO2 assumed as a default in [12].
In Appendix D we compare the results for the relative mar-
ket value to the result from [12], with and without the technol-
ogy assumption changes. We find good agreement between the
models.
To explore the impact of flexibility, in some scenarios we
also allow the expansion of the transmission grid and the instal-
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Figure 3: Comparison of the market value of wind and solar as their combined
penetration is mandated using (i) a VRE policy and (ii) a CO2 policy.
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Figure 4: Market quantities under a VRE policy as the penetration of wind and
solar energy covering electricity demand is increased. In this case there is no
additional flexibility from storage or transmission reinforcement.
lation of new storage in the form of batteries and underground
hydrogen storage (based on electrolysis of water and hydrogen
turbines to feed back into the grid).
6. Numerical results
6.1. The market value of wind and solar depend on the policy
measure
We contrast two main cases, one where VRE generation is
driven by a constraint on minimum penetration level (VRE pol-
icy) and another case where VRE generation is driven indirectly
by a cap on CO2 emissions (CO2 policy), which makes fossil-
fueled generation more costly and thus boosts VRE generation
in the cost minimization. Technically, the VRE policy is im-
plemented by a constraint in the optimization model (equation
(19)) that mandates a certain share of the demand be fulfilled
by wind and solar. The CO2 policy is implemented with a con-
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Figure 5: Market quantities under a CO2 policy as the average CO2 emission
factor is reduced, forcing up the wind and solar penetration.
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Figure 6: Comparison of average system generation cost (excluding CO2 price)
and average market price for the VRE and CO2 policies without flexibility.
straint on the maximum CO2 emissions, which corresponds to
a tax on CO2-emitting generators (equation (24)).
The resulting market value (MV) at penetration levels for
wind and solar between 0 and 70% for these two cases are
shown in Figure 3. The results for the VRE policy case confirm
what is widely seen in the literature [12]: MV declines with
rising penetration, eventually dropping to zero at a VRE pene-
tration of 50%. The CO2 policy shows a quite different trend:
the MV dips slightly, then increases gently up to just over 80
AC/MWh at 70% penetration.
This shows clearly that market value behaves differently de-
pending on the policy used to reach a given level of wind and
solar generation.
Now we expand upon the results for each policy in detail.
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Figure 7: Market quantities under a CO2 policy as the average CO2 emission
factor is reduced, forcing up the wind and solar penetration, for scenarios with
and without additional flexibility from transmission and storage.
6.2. Market value with VRE policy
Figure 4 shows the behaviour of the MV, LCOE and Feed-in-
Premium (FiP) µs1 for the VRE policy.
The LCOE remains approximately constant, dipping first and
then rising gently. The dip occurs because of the changing mix
of wind and solar, which have different LCOEs: first wind is
preferred, which has a higher LCOE but a more regular pro-
file, then solar increases, which has a lower LCOE, before wind
takes over again at higher penetrations. The rise in LCOE re-
flects a preference for wind at higher penetrations, as well as
curtailment which impacts the total generation in the denomi-
nator of the LCOE.
The FiP has to make up the difference between the MV and
LCOE, and thus rises accordingly. The FiP is always positive
because the equilibrium solution without the VRE policy does
not contain wind and solar (since the cost of generation from
fossil fuels is so low in the model). The MV can reach zero and
even become negative, since the FiP can force market prices to
be negative in some hours; simulations where negative prices
are forbidden are presented in Appendix E.2.
6.3. Market value with CO2 policy
Figure 5 shows the MV, LCOE and CO2 tax µCO2
2 for the
CO2 policy.
Since wind and solar have no direct CO2 emissions, by equa-
tion (3) the LCOE is exactly equal to the MV. The dip and gentle
rise of LCOE has the same explanation as for the VRE policy
(see Figure E.20 for the changing shares of wind and solar).
The CO2 price required to induce a given VRE penetration
rises to 70AC/tCO2 at a penetration of 50%, before rapidly rising
1As outlined in Section 4.3, the Feed-in-Premium (FiP) µs is the dual, or
shadow price, of the VRE constraint (19).
2As outlined in Section 4.4, the CO2 tax µCO2 is the dual, or shadow price,
of the CO2 constraint (24).
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to above 220 AC/tCO2 at 70%. 70 AC/tCO2 represents a tripling
of 2019 CO2 certificate prices in the European Union Emissions
Trading System (ETS), but is only marginally more than the 45-
55 AC/tCO2 range in 2030 required to fulfil the Paris Agreement
according to recent modelling [38], and considerably less than
the estimated 180 AC/tCO2 damages due to climate change [39].
Until 50% penetration the behaviour of the system under a CO2
policy only requires moderate changes. Beyond 50%, the lack
of additional flexibility options makes CO2 mitigation more ex-
pensive.
6.4. System cost and market price
Figure 6 compares the rising average system generation cost
for the two policies, including all capital and marginal costs
but excluding subsidies and the CO2 price. The costs rises at
a similar rate with VRE penetration, but are slightly higher
for the CO2 policy. Costs are higher with a CO2 policy be-
cause increasing wind and solar penetration is not the only cost-
effective measure to reduce CO2 emissions: switching from lig-
nite and coal to natural gas is prioritized before VRE capacity
at some penetrations. These measures make the system more
expensive than the VRE policy case for a given VRE penetra-
tion. (If we compare the policies based on CO2 emissions, then
the CO2 policy is naturally more efficient at reducing emissions,
see Appendix Figure E.23.)
Figure 6 also shows how the load-weighted average electric-
ity price changes with penetration for each policy. For the VRE
policy, prices are depressed by the merit order effect when VRE
generate and by negative prices when VRE are price-setting, as
discussed in Section 4.3. For the CO2 policy the merit order ef-
fect of VRE generation is counter-acted by the increasing cost
of fossil-fuelled generation, pushing up prices when these gen-
erators are price-setting (see Section 4.4).
For the VRE policy, consumers pay less than the generation
cost, since the difference between the average market price and
the generation cost is accounted for by the external subsidies
paid to VRE generation. For the CO2 policy, consumers pay
more than the generation cost, since they must also pay for CO2
emissions according to the prevailing CO2 price.
6.5. Including transmission and storage flexibility
If additional flexibility options are made available to the in-
vestment optimization, the market value remains regular all the
way up to 100% VRE penetration with a CO2 policy. Flexibil-
ity in this case includes the option to build new transmission ca-
pacity between the countries, as well as the availability of both
battery storage and hydrogen storage (based on electrolysis of
water and hydrogen turbines to feed back into the grid). The
results for MV with and without flexibility are shown in Figure
7. Without flexibility, the MV increases strongly above 70%
because of high curtailment that depresses the LCOE. High cur-
tailment reflects the mismatch between VRE and demand pro-
files. With flexibility, the MV rises slowly before plateauing
at around 70 AC/MWh. At 100% penetration the average total
system cost is higher at 103 AC/MWh, reflecting the additional
flexibility options, in this case primarily the hydrogen storage.
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Figure 8: Breakdown of average system cost (total cost divided by total load)
under a CO2 policy as the CO2 budget is tightened, for a scenario with trans-
mission expansion as well as short- and long-term storage. The average system
cost, including the CO2 price, is equal to the load-weighted average market
price by equation (13).
The CO2 price rises more or less linearly from 50% to 100%
penetration to a final value of 150 AC/tCO2 (less than the climate
damages of 180 AC/tCO2 estimated in [39]).
The breakdown of system cost by component in Figure 8
shows the substitution of technologies as the CO2 limit is tight-
ened. Hydrogen storage is critical for removing the final emis-
sions from the system, since hydrogen can smooth the variabil-
ity of wind and solar over multiple days. The fact that wind and
solar dominate system costs at the same time as dominating en-
ergy generation guarantees a relative market value (RMV) close
to unity according to equation (18), which is in agreement with
the closeness of market price to market value in Figure E.21.
Similar results have also been shown in a model coupled to
building heating and transport, where demand response from
electric vehicles and heat pumps, as well as cheap storage of
heat, hydrogen and methane, help to support prices and keep
the RMV close to unity [32].
7. Discussion
7.1. The mechanisms underlying MV decline
This paper contrasts the impact of VRE- and CO2 policies on
the market value (MV) of wind and solar. We find that the MV
decreases strongly under VRE policies, but not under CO2 poli-
cies. Thus, the declining MV of VRE that has been observed in
previous literature [10, 12, 15, 40] is due primarily to the im-
plicit assumption of policy regime, and not, as has been claimed
before [12, 15], to the variability of wind and solar.
Previous papers on market value have viewed a CO2 price as
one among many other mechanisms by which the MV decline
can be mitigated under a VRE policy regime [12, 40, 41]. In
contrast, we make the CO2 price the primary mechanism for
raising VRE penetration.
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We grant a whole host of strategies, which can be collec-
tively labeled ’flexibility measures’3, as having the potential to
dampen the MV decline under a VRE policy, yet not solving
the bigger issue of the ‘cannibalization effect’ [43]. Thus, we
do recognize the fact that variability matters as to the rate of
decline of MV under VRE policies. One example of this is that
the rate of MV decline differs depending on the temporal pat-
tern and cost structure of the technology that is forced in (com-
pare the effect of a VRE policy in Figure 4 with a policy to force
in nuclear in Appendix Figure E.14)4. Policy driven by a CO2
price, however, has the potential to prevent any MV decline, in
addition to its other advantages of being technologically neutral
and economically efficient [44, 45].
7.2. Policy implications
The main policy implication is that policy makers should not
see market value decline under VRE policies as an indication
that variable renewable energy is hitting fundamental integra-
tion limits. MV decline is a result of policy choices rather than
an intrinsic property of VRE. The strong dependence of mar-
ket value on the policy regime (and on the rest of the system
composition) means that market value should be used with a
keen awareness of its limitations. Just as the LCOE metric does
not provide a complete picture of the cost performance of tech-
nologies [46], market value should be used in concert with other
metrics when comparing technologies.
There are many situations where VRE policies are preferable
to CO2 policies, such as when encouraging research, develop-
ment and deployment, and reducing investor risk, or because
in some jurisdictions subsidies are more popular and easier to
implement than taxes. In these cases the measure of success-
ful integration should be the total cost of the system, as well
as secondary measures such as the curtailment rate, rather than
market value. Comparison to the economically efficient solu-
tion with a CO2 policy may also provide useful guidance.
7.3. Effects on investors
The cost of capital for VRE investors depends on the per-
ceived risk profile. The financial risk may differ substantially
under VRE- and CO2 policies: CO2 policies send a market sig-
nal to encourage low-emission generation, whereas one of the
main purposes of VRE policies is to provide investor certainty
for capital-intensive investments that might otherwise be sub-
ject to market risks from fluctuating electricity and CO2 prices
[47, 48]. Lower risk means lower financing costs, which feeds
through to a lower LCOE [49–51]. A hybrid policy framework
can provide both of these benefits: a CO2 price to support low-
emission generation, and a guaranteed per-kWh feed-in-tariff
for VRE generation that is tuned to be close to the market value
so that it provides investor certainty with minimal market dis-
tortion (i.e. the Feed-in Premium, µΓ in equation (1), is close to
zero).
3These have been individually investigated in previous literature and may be
DSM measures [29, 40], storage [12], hydro power [30, 31, 42] or transmission
extensions [12, 42].
4This was observed also previously in [14].
7.4. Effects on consumer welfare
The different policies have a strong effect on the average elec-
tricity price that consumers have to pay on the market (Figure
6). VRE policies lower prices and thus increase the consumer
surplus; if the demand were elastic, lower prices would also in-
crease the consumption rate. The surplus can be reduced by
passing on the costs of covering the FiP to consumers, but the
consumption rate will still be higher than is economically effi-
cient. A CO2 policy more efficiently reflects climate costs and
the necessary trade-offs in the economy.
7.5. Negative prices
With the price formation mechanism used here, prices may
become negative, since the electricity price in the model for a
VRE policy reflects a situation where the VRE generator bids in
its running cost less a feed-in premium equivalent to the shadow
cost of the VRE-constraint. A similar construct was used and
negative prices were observed by Pahle et al. [29]. (In setups
where the available energy rather than the dispatched energy is
constrained [12] VRE support does not cause negative prices,
see the discussion in Appendix B.1.)
In reality, some countries have policies that withdraw subsi-
dies when prices go negative for a long period of time (6 hours
in the case of Germany [34]). Under such policy regimes, it
would be rational for the producer never to bid in less than its
running costs to the market, and thus the market prices would
be higher. In such cases, the electricity price decreases only
slightly for increasing penetration levels of VRE (see Appendix
E.2).
7.6. MV under different policies in reality: the example of Ger-
many
It is undisputed that the revenues from sales on the market
for VRE generators have decreased in the real world, which has
been shown in several studies on historical data for electricity
prices [1–8, 12]. While this is partly due to short-term effects
as the rest of the system takes time to reach a new equilibrium
with VRE, it also reflects policy choices. In Germany, subsi-
dies were used to increase the share of VRE in electricity to
around 26% in 2018. The average power price and market val-
ues of wind and solar fell from 2011 to 2016, as can be seen
in Figure 9. This is an effect of the FiT policy regime (which
is a VRE policy) combined with falling fuel prices. However,
from 2016 onwards, prices increase again, with market values
approaching current German LCOEs for wind and solar. This
has been attributed to an increasing CO2 price on the EU Emis-
sions Trading System (ETS) market (a CO2 policy) [52]. Thus
the German prices (Figure 9) may be interpreted as a support-
ing argument for our evaluation of the effect when VRE policies
dominate (up until 2016) and when CO2 policies have a strong
effect (after 2016).
7.7. Limitations of this study
In this study we have focused on the mechanisms connecting
cost, price and policy. Many of the numerical results depend
on the background system choices we have made. The base
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Figure 9: Market data from Germany, 2010-2018. As the CO2 price rose to-
wards the end of the period, so have the average market price and market values
of wind and solar. Data from [53].
model excludes new nuclear, CCS, demand-side management
(DSM), sector coupling, hydro and interconnection across the
whole of Europe. A larger geographic scope or the inclusion
of hydro, DSM or sector coupling would expand the flexibility
mechanisms. These additions to the model would dampen the
decrease of MV under VRE policies and decrease system cost.
8. Conclusions
The market value of wind and solar (VRE) depends strongly
on the policies used to promote them. Previous studies have
implicitly assumed that direct subsidies are used to force VRE
penetration, which have the effect of depressing both their mar-
ket value and overall market prices. If instead a CO2 price
is used to promote low-emission generation, market values in
long-term equilibria are guaranteed to cover generator costs.
Market values remain stable even at VRE penetrations ap-
proaching 100%, as long as sufficient flexibility from transmis-
sion and storage is available in the system.
This means that declining market value under VRE policies
is not a reliable indicator of problems with the market integra-
tion of VRE. Declining market value is rather a side-effect of
choosing a VRE policy. A better measure of market integration
is the total system cost, or secondary measures such as curtail-
ment levels.
By showing the strong dependence of market value on policy
choice, we have thus resolved the paradox between the eco-
nomic literature showing market value decline with penetration
under VRE policies, and the engineering literature showing that
high penetrations of VRE can be cost-effective under CO2 poli-
cies.
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Appendix A. Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
In this section we set the signs and notation for the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
We have an objective function over variables labelled by l:
max
xl
f (xl) (A.1)
subject to equality (i) and inequality ( j) constraints:
gi(xl) = 0 ⊥ λi (A.2)
h j(xl) ≤ 0 ⊥ µ j (A.3)
We build the KKT Lagrangian:
L(xl, λi, µ j) = f (xl) −
∑
i
λigi(xl) −
∑
j
µ jh j(xl) (A.4)
The KKT conditions are equations satisfied by xl, λi and µ j at
the optimum point.
First we have stationarity:
0 =
∂L
∂xl
=
∂ f
∂xl
−
∑
i
λi
∂gi
∂xl
−
∑
j
µ j
∂h j
∂xl
(A.5)
then primal feasibility:
gi(xl) = 0 (A.6)
h j(xl) ≤ 0 (A.7)
then dual feasibility:
µ j ≥ 0 (A.8)
and finally complementary slackness:
µ jh j(xl) = 0 (A.9)
(i.e. either µ j = 0 or the inequality constraint is saturated
h j(xl) = 0).
Appendix B. Further Proofs
Appendix B.1. Single node long-term equilibrium with VRE
policy for available power
If we add a constraint for a subset S of generators based on
the available power before curtailment, as is done in [12], rather
than the actual dispatched power
−
∑
s∈S ,t
g¯s,tGs ≤ −Θ ⊥ µΘ (B.1)
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(g¯s,t is the hourly capacity factor for generator s at time t) this
alters the stationarity equation (9) for Gs to
∂L
∂Gs
= 0⇒ −cs +
∑
t
g¯s,tµ¯s,t +
∑
t
g¯s,tµΘ = 0 (B.2)
so that now for renewable generators
csGs +
∑
t
osgs,t =
∑
t
λtgs,t + µΘGs
∑
t
g¯s,t (B.3)
If there is no curtailment, g¯s,tGs = gs,t and this becomes the
same expression as (21).
Since µΘ multiplies the capacity Gs, this can be interpreted
as a subsidy for capacity. (In Section 4.3 we fixed the share of
dispatched generation instead, so there it was a subsidy on dis-
patch.) This means the effective marginal cost is not affected
and does not go negative. This makes sense because if capac-
ity is subsidised, generators have no incentive to feed in when
prices are negative. Instead, they curtail the available energy.
Dividing (B.3) by the total generation
∑
t gs,t we find for s ∈
S
LCOEs = MVs + µΘ
Gs
∑
t g¯s,t∑
t gs,t
∀s ∈ S (B.4)
For s < S we have the regular no-profit rule
LCOEs = MVs ∀s < S (B.5)
Appendix B.2. Single node long-term equilibrium with limited
installation potentials
If there are limits on installable potentials for generators
Gs ≤ Gmaxs ⊥ µmaxs (B.6)
then we get
∂L
∂Gs
= 0⇒ cs −
∑
t
µ¯s,t + µ
max
s = 0 (B.7)
and now
csGs +
∑
t
osgs,t =
∑
t
λtgs,t −
∑
s
µmaxs Gs (B.8)
We’ve effectively added to the capital cost cs a cost related to
the scarcity of the potential for Gs, which drives up the cost.
Because the resource is scarce, generators can claim extra rev-
enue for this scarcity, i.e. because there is no replacement, there
is extra profit to be obtained from the market.
Appendix B.3. Single node long-term equilibrium with storage
Suppose we add storage units r with discharging dispatch gdisr,t
and power capacity Gdisr , storing power g
sto
r,t and capacity G
sto
r ,
and state of charge gener,t and energy capacity G
ene
r . The efficiency
from hour to hour is ηene (for losses due to self-discharge), the
storing efficiency is ηsto and the dispatch efficiency is ηdis.
We add to the objective function an additional cost term:
−
∑
r,◦
c◦rG
◦
r = −
∑
r
cener G
ene
r −
∑
r
cstor G
sto
r −
∑
r
cdisr G
dis
r
where the symbol ◦ runs over {ene, sto, dis}. We assume no
marginal costs for the dispatch.
The demand balancing equation (5) is modified to:∑
a
da,t −
∑
s
gs,t −
∑
r
gdisr,t +
∑
r
gstor,t = 0 ⊥ λt ∀t (B.9)
The standard capacity constraints apply:
−g◦r,t ≤ 0 ⊥ µ
¯
◦
r,t
∀r, t (B.10)
g◦r,t −G◦r ≤ 0 ⊥ µ¯◦r,t ∀r, t (B.11)
In addition we have the constraint for the consistency of the
state of charge between hours according to how much was dis-
patched or stored:
gener,t −ηener gener,t−1−ηstor gstor,t +(ηdisr )−1gdisr,t = 0 ⊥ λener,t ∀r, t (B.12)
We assume that the state of charge is cyclic gener,−1 = g
ene
r,T−1.
From KKT stationarity we get:
∂L
∂G◦r
= 0⇒ −c◦r +
∑
t
µ¯◦r,t = 0 (B.13)
∂L
∂gdisr,t
= 0⇒ λt + µ
¯
dis
r,t
− µ¯disr,t − (ηdisr )−1λener,t = 0 (B.14)
∂L
∂gstor,t
= 0⇒ −λt + µ
¯
sto
r,t
− µ¯stor,t + ηstor λener,t = 0 (B.15)
∂L
∂gener,t
= 0⇒ µ
¯
ene
r,t
− µ¯ener,t − λener,t + ηener λener,t+1 = 0 (B.16)
The zero-profit rule for storage proceeds the usual way:∑
◦
c◦rG
◦
r =
∑
◦,t
G◦r µ¯
◦
r,t =
∑
◦,t
g◦r,tµ¯
◦
r,t
=
∑
t
[
λtgdisr,t − (ηdisr )−1λener,t gdisr,t − λtgstor,t + ηstor λener,t gstor,t
−λener,t gener,t + ηener λener,t+1gener,t
]
=
∑
t
λt
[
gdisr,t − gstor,t
]
+
∑
t
λener,t
[
−(ηdisr )−1gdisr,t + ηstor gstor,t − gener,t + ηener gener,t−1
]
=
∑
t
λt
[
gdisr,t − gstor,t
]
(B.17)
The first equality is stationarity for G◦r ; the second is compli-
mentarity for constraint (B.11); the third is stationarity for g◦r,t
and complimentarity for constraint (B.10); the fouth rearranges
terms and shifts the cyclic sum over gener,t ; the final equality uses
the state of charge constraint (B.12).
The final results shows that the storage recovers its capital
costs by arbitrage, charging while prices λt are low, and dis-
charging while prices are high.
The relation between market value and LCOE of generators
in the system are not affected by the introduction of storage
(although the optimal capacities may change).
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Appendix B.4. Multi-node long-term equilibrium with network
For multiple nodes the demand and generator variables gain
an extra index for the node n to which they are attached, and a
term is added to the objective function for the costs c` of each
line capacity F` connecting the nodes:
−
∑
`
c`F` (B.18)
The flow can move electricity from one node to the other in
each hour f`,t, so that the nodal balance equation is modified∑
a
dn,a,t −
∑
s
gn,s,t =
∑
`
Kn` f`,t ⊥ λn,t ∀n, t
(B.19)
where Kn` is the incidence matrix for the network. This is
Kirchhoff’s Current Law (KCL).
There are additional constraints on the flows related to the
line capacity
f`,t − F` ≤ 0 ⊥ µ¯`,t ∀`, t (B.20)
− f`,t − F` ≤ 0 ⊥ µ
¯ `,t
∀`, t (B.21)
and to Kirchhoff’s Voltage Law (KVL):∑
`
C`,cx` f`,t = 0 ⊥ λc,t ∀c, t (B.22)
where c label an independent basis of closed cycles in the net-
work defined by the cycle matrix C`,c, and x` is the series reac-
tance of the line.
From KKT stationarity we get in addition:
∂L
∂ f`,t
= 0⇒
∑
n
λn,tKn,` + µ
¯ `,t
− µ¯`,t −
∑
c
λc,tC`,cx` = 0
∂L
∂F`
= 0⇒ c` −
∑
t
µ¯`,t −
∑
t
µ
¯ `,t
= 0 (B.23)
and for complementary slackness:
µ¯`,t( f`,t − F`) = 0 (B.24)
µ
¯ `,t
( f`,t + F`) = 0 (B.25)
The no-profit rule becomes:
c`F` =
∑
t
(µ¯`,t + µ
¯ `,t
)F` (B.26)
=
∑
t
(µ¯`,t − µ
¯ `,t
) f`,t (B.27)
=
∑
t,n
λn,tKn,` f`,t −
∑
t,c
λc,tC`,cx` f`,t (B.28)
The first term is the sum over flows f`,t multiplied by the price
difference between the connect nodes
∑
t,n λn,tKn,`, i.e. the con-
gestion revenue. The second term is a distortion that disappears
if KVL is not enforced (i.e. in a transport model with only KCL,
it would not appear).
Without KVL total costs still equal total revenue, analogous
to (13): ∑
n,s
cn,sGn,s +
∑
n,s,t
on,sgn,s,t +
∑
`
c`F` (B.29)
=
∑
n,s,t
λn,tgn,s,t +
∑
n,`,t
λn,tKn,` f`,t (B.30)
=
∑
n,a,t
λn,tdn,a,t (B.31)
where we’ve used (B.19).
Appendix B.5. Non-linear generator cost function
Suppose we have non-linear functions for the cost of new
capacity Cs(Gs) and operation Os(gs,t):
max
da,t ,gs,t ,Gs
∑
a,t
Ua,t(da,t) −
∑
s
Cs(Gs) −
∑
s,t
Os(gs,t)
 (B.32)
subject to∑
a
da,t −
∑
s
gs,t = 0 ⊥ λt ∀t (B.33)
−gs,t ≤ 0 ⊥ µ
¯ s,t
∀s, t (B.34)
gs,t − g¯s,tGs ≤ 0 ⊥ µ¯s,t ∀s, t (B.35)
Now the relationship between costs and revenue becomes
GsC′s(Gs) +
∑
t
gs,tO′s(gs,t) =
∑
t
λtgs,t (B.36)
This becomes a statement about marginal profit, i.e. small ad-
ditions of capacity or generation will not generate any profit or
loss.
Generators with cost functions with positive derivatives will
make a profit since revenue will be higher than costs. For ex-
ample, if Cs(Gs) = csGns for n > 1 and there are no operating
costs, the revenue will be ncsGns , n times higher than the cost.
These generators may however be undercut by other generators
in the market with different cost functions.
The effects of VRE and CO2 policies on market value are
unchanged.
Appendix B.6. Equivalent problems without constraints
If we have a generic optimisation problem with variables
xl, ym of the form
max
xl,ym
 f (xl) −∑
m
omym
 (B.37)
subject to equality and inequality constraints:
gi(xl, ym) = 0 ⊥ λi (B.38)
h j(xl, ym) ≤ 0 ⊥ µ j (B.39)∑
m
cmym ≤ K ⊥ µ (B.40)
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then we can prove that at the optimal point the solutions for
xl, ym, λl, µ j are identical to the following problem without the
final constraint (B.40), where we have frozen µ from the above
problem:
max
xl,ym
 f (xl) −∑
m
(om + cmµ)ym
 (B.41)
subject to equality (i) and inequality ( j) constraints:
gi(xl, ym) = 0 ⊥ λi (B.42)
h j(xl, ym) ≤ 0 ⊥ µ j (B.43)
This holds as long as the maximization problem is a concave
function, the inequality constraints are continuously differen-
tiable convex functions and the equality constraints are affine
functions (i.e. as long as the KKT conditions are sufficient for
optimality).
The proof is standard in Lagrangian theory and follows by
showing that the KKT conditions are identical. From the first
problem the only conditions where the extra constraint is rele-
vant is the stationarity for ym
0 =
∂L
∂ym
= −om −
∑
i
λi
∂gi
∂ym
−
∑
j
µ j
∂h j
∂ym
− cmµ (B.44)
This is the same as the stationarity for the second problem. If
the final constraint (B.40) is not binding, then µ = 0 by compli-
mentarity and the problems are also identical. QED.
Appendix C. Technology assumptions
The technology assumptions from the original model EMMA
[12] and our model PyPSA are compared in Table C.1. While
nuclear and lignite with CCS are disabled in the main calcula-
tions, for the calculations in the Appendix with nuclear the costs
from [54] are applied, to reflect experience in recent projects.
Power plant lifetimes are taken from [12] (nuclear has a life-
time of 50 years, while other plants have 25 years).
Battery assumptions are drawn from [21], hydrogen (H2)
electrolysis from [55] and underground H2 storage from [56].
Appendix D. Comparison of PyPSA to EMMA results for
RMV
In this section the results from [12] for the long-term rela-
tive market values of solar and wind are compared to the results
from the reimplementation in PyPSA. Figure D.10 shows the
relative market values in the PyPSA model with the same tech-
nology assumptions as [12] and with a constraint on available
renewable energy following [12] (see Appendix B.1). Figure
D.11 shows the results with the wind and solar costs updated,
the CO2 price set to zero, the removal of nuclear and CCS as
options, and a constraint on dispatched renewable energy fol-
lowing Section 4.3. Table D.2 compares the relative market
values for different sampling points.
First we compare the results from EMMA (column 1 in Ta-
ble D.2 and Figures 18 and 27 in [12]) and the reimplementa-
tion in PyPSA (column 2 in Table D.2 and Figure D.10). While
Quantity Unit EMMA PyPSA
wind cost AC/kWp 1300 1040
solar cost AC/kWp 2000 510
nuclear cost AC/kWp 4000 6000
nuclear fuel cost AC/kWhth 3 3
lignite cost AC/kWp 2200 2200
lignite fuel cost AC/kWhth 3 3
lignite+CCS cost AC/kWp 3500 n/a
lignite+CCS fuel cost AC/kWhth 3 n/a
coal cost AC/kWp 1500 1500
coal fuel cost AC/kWhth 11.5 11.5
CCGT cost AC/kWp 1000 1000
CCGT fuel cost AC/kWhth 25 25
OCGT cost AC/kWp 600 600
OCGT fuel cost AC/kWhth 50 50
load shedding cost AC/kWhel 1000 1000
battery inverter AC/kWp n/a 333
battery storage AC/kWh n/a 167
H2 electrolysis AC/kWel n/a 750
H2 electrolysis efficiency % n/a 80
H2 turbine AC/kWel n/a 800
H2 storage AC/kWh n/a 0.5
Table C.1: Comparison of technology assumptions in the different models.
there is clear agreement in the overall shape and trajectory of
the curves, in three of the four cases PyPSA underestimates
the relative market values compared to EMMA, particularly for
the case of solar at 15% penetration. There are several factors
causing the disagreement between EMMA and PyPSA: EMMA
has baseload incentives which alter prices; EMMA has incen-
tives for flexible generators like OCGT that reduce their capi-
tal costs, encouraging higher marginal cost generators into the
market and pushing up prices; for the denominator of the RMV,
EMMA takes a simple price average over time, while PyPSA
load-weights average prices over time (emphasising times of
high load when prices are either higher (evening) or lower (mid-
day solar peak)); and finally it appears the EMMA code uses a
lifetime of 25 years for nuclear rather than the 50 years applied
here. The solar disagreement is also large because the slope of
the curve here is steep, so any deviation is magnified.
Next we compare the results from the reimplementation in
PyPSA (column 2 in Table D.2 and Figure D.10) and the ver-
sion of PyPSA with updated assumptions (column 3 in Table
D.2 and Figure D.11). One of the main change in costs was
a reduction in solar costs, and this is reflected in Figures D.10
and D.11 by the fact that the case with both wind and solar now
differs from the pure wind case, since solar is competitive. The
reduction of the CO2 price from 20 AC /tCO2 to zero helps to
suppress prices. And finally the constraint on dispatched energy
rather than available energy means that costs decrease faster
and go to zero, since VRE subsidy can cause hours of negative
prices. When we constrain available energy, VRE is curtailed
at zero price, meaning that RMV flatlines at high penetrations
as in Figure D.10 (note that at high penetrations, a lot of the
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Figure D.10: The relative market value of wind and solar as the share of their
available energy is changed in the model for the case without storage or trans-
mission reinforcement using all costs from [12].
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Figure D.11: The relative market value of wind and solar as the share of their
dispatched energy is changed in the model for the case without storage or trans-
mission reinforcement using our updated costs.
energy is curtailed).
Appendix E. Additional results
Appendix E.1. VRE policy with wind, solar and nuclear sepa-
rately
Results for VRE policies applied separately to wind are
shown in Figure E.12, solar in Figure E.13 and nuclear in E.14.
The solar market value declines much faster than for wind,
as has been seen in previous results in this paper and elsewhere
in the literature.
The effect of forced penetration on nuclear is similar. The
equilibrium solution with the VRE constraint does not contain
nuclear, because the cost is too high; a non-zero subsidy is re-
quired to cover the difference between its average market value
Model EMMA PyPSA PyPSA
Costs [12] [12] adjusted
solar at 0% 0.9 0.74 0.54
solar at 15% 0.58 0.41 0.21
wind at 0% 1.1 1.02 1.1
wind at 30% 0.64 0.53 0.36
Table D.2: Comparison of relative market values in the different models.
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Figure E.12: Market quantities as the penetration of wind energy covering elec-
tricity demand is increased. In this case there is no additional flexibility from
storage or transmission reinforcement.
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Figure E.13: Market quantities as the penetration of solar energy covering elec-
tricity demand is increased. In this case there is no additional flexibility from
storage or transmission reinforcement.
and the LCOE. Because it is available at all times, it achieves
penetration of up to 75% before the market value declines,
which corresponds to the minimum value of the load. Above
this point, it reaches lower capacity factors, forcing the LCOE
up and the market value down.
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Figure E.14: Market quantities as the penetration of nuclear energy covering
electricity demand is increased. In this case there is no additional flexibility
from storage or transmission reinforcement.
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Figure E.15: Market quantities for a VRE policy for wind and solar with no
negative prices and without additional flexibility.
Appendix E.2. VRE policy with no negative prices
In this section we take the results from the VRE policy and
forbid negative prices, by setting the price to zero whenever
it goes below zero. The results for systems without additional
flexibility are shown for wind and solar in Figure E.15, for wind
in Figure E.16, for solar in Figure E.17 and for nuclear in Figure
E.18. In all cases the fall in market price and market value is
stalled at high penetrations, and never reaches zero.
Appendix E.3. CO2 policy details
In Figure E.19 the effect of a CO2 constraint on average mar-
ket prices, wind and solar MV (equal to LCOE), the CO2 dual
price and the wind and solar penetrations are plotted. From
the unconstrained equilibrium with emissions of around 1.2
tCO2/MWhel down to about 0.7 tCO2/MWhel, emissions are
reduced by substituting coal for lignite, and gas for goal. Be-
low 0.7 tCO2/MWhel, wind and solar penetrations rise steadily
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Figure E.16: Market quantities for a VRE policy for wind with no negative
prices and without additional flexibility.
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Figure E.17: Market quantities for a VRE policy for solar with no negative
prices and without additional flexibility.
to replace natural gas. The CO2 price required to reach each tar-
get rises in steps as particular fuels are substituted, before ris-
ing very steeply below 0.3 tCO2/MWhel, where it gets harder
to match the variable profiles of wind and solar with the load.
The market price increases with a stricter CO2 constraint,
since the rising CO2 price increases all effective marginal costs
os → os + esµK . The market values of wind and solar initially
remain steady, since they are equal to the LCOE, which is sta-
ble. However, as penetration rises, curtailment increases and
the LCOE drops.
Figure E.20 shows the corresponding figure as a function of
the combined wind and solar penetration.
The analysis was repeated with the addition of transmission
expansion and storage investment possibilities for battery and
hydrogen storage; the corresponding results are plotted in Fig-
ure E.21 as a function of the CO2 limit and in Figure E.22 as a
function of penetration. With the additional flexibility, curtail-
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Figure E.18: Market quantities for a VRE policy for nuclear with no negative
prices and without additional flexibility.
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Figure E.19: Market quantities as the average CO2 emission factor is reduced
to zero for a scenario without additional flexibility.
ment is limited and a VRE penetration of 100% without either
the average market price (which reflects total system cost) or
the market values rising drastically.
Appendix E.4. Comparing system cost as function CO2 emis-
sions
In Figure 6 we compared the system costs under the VRE and
CO2 policies as a function of the penetration of wind and solar
without flexibility. In Figure E.23 we provide the complemen-
tary figure comparing the system costs of the two policies as a
function of average system CO2 intensity. For the system setup
here, the policies provide similar results until higher penetra-
tions, at which the CO2 policy is, unsurprisingly, more efficient
at reducing CO2 emissions.
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Figure E.20: Market quantities as the average CO2 emission factor is reduced
to zero for a scenario without additional flexibility.
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Figure E.21: Market quantities as the average CO2 emission factor is reduced to
zero for a scenario with transmission expansion as well as short- and long-term
storage.
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